














Does political rhetoric framing public policies thwart political participation? Latinos say yes, and 
no. 







Schneider and Ingram’s theory of policy design (1997) states that policy making includes a 
process through which knowledge is socially constructed and is a domain in which power elites 
are able to manipulate symbols, rhetoric, images, and distort logical lines of inquiry to justify 
policies that privilege certain social groups while stigmatizing and disenfranchising others.  
Policies act as lessons, and individuals, in turn, then internalize messages on their value to 
society based on the policies that are assigned to them.  Using qualitative data in the form of in-
depth interviews conducted with Latinos in Arizona, this paper asks, Do Latinos characterize S.B. 
1070 as a degenerative policy, and if so, what is the impact of this policy on their civic 
engagement? Findings show that a degenerative policy as S.B. 1070 causes harm by obstructing 
the political integration of Latinos and Latino immigrants in the United States, as they report 
feeling increasingly targeted by the state and repeatedly portrayed as criminals and threat to 
national security.  As a result, Latinos tend to alienate and have little to no desire to engage in 
conventional forms of political participation; civic engagement attitudes are shaped and formed 
on the premise that participation is futile as the state does not care for them and will instead 
politically gain from their disenfranchisement.  This paper provides insight on how Latinos’ 
political behaviors and attitudes will likely result in stigma and withdrawal given the current 
policy initiatives proposed and/or implemented now that the Trump administration is in power.  
Public administration, as the action part of government, has the opportunity to play a crucial role 
in changing these policy dynamics into a more positive scenario, one in which democracy is 
strengthened rather than stifled, that upholds key values of social justice and equity in its 
interactions with the constituents it serves (especially by street-level bureaucrats), and is devoted 
to community building and improvement.  
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 This paper uses Schneider and Ingram’s theory of policy design (1997) to evaluate 
whether Arizona’s infamous immigration legislation Senate Bill (S.B.) 10701 meets the criteria 
of a “degenerative policy design” (p. 6).   This specific type of policy design is comprised of 
implicit or explicit social constructions that target and stigmatize certain societal groups; as a 
result, groups who are socially constructed as deviants and criminals experience political 
marginalization and disenfranchisement, lose trust and/or belief in formal government processes, 
and, ultimately, withdraw from formal political arenas based on their exchanges with the state.  
This type of degenerative policy design is made possible by a manipulation by those who are 
power positions (and in power relationships) who exploit the use of policy dynamics in the 
interests of their own personal political gain.  “Such policies distort our understanding of 
citizenship and pervert the capacity of public policy to solve problems and serve justice” (1997, 
p. 6).   
Levels of conventional Latino political participation (i.e., electoral voting) persistently 
remain low in comparison to all other racial and ethnic groups in the United States (U.S.), even 
when controlling for level of education and socio-economic status.  Barriers to parity in political 
participation represent barriers to social equity.  Meanwhile, as this phenomenon remains 
stagnant, the national media coverage on the politicization of immigrants, national security, and 
refugees/asylum seekers continues to climb and gain exposure on all national media outlets and 
social media.  The national political discourse shaped by the Trump administration has been used 
just as Schneider and Ingram describe, by manipulating political images and rhetoric to create 
                                                        
1 S.B. 1070 was amended to be House Bill 2162. 
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the social construction that Latinos are “criminals and rapists” and therefore undeserving of state 
resources and in need to be disciplined and punished.  
 This research empirically tests the “translation dynamics” causal mechanism of Schneider 
and Ingram’s theory by asking Latinos directly about the messages they internalize as the result 
of public policy initiatives and the political discourse framing these.  Using qualitative data, this 
paper asks, Do Latinos characterize S.B. 1070 as a degenerative policy, and if so, what is the 
impact of this policy on their civic engagement?  
Findings confirm that S.B. 1070 is a degenerative policy as S.B. 1070 and ultimately 
causes harm by obstructing the political integration of Latinos and Latino immigrants because 
these feel increasingly targeted by the state and socially portrayed as criminals.  As a result, 
Latinos tend to alienate and have little to no desire to engage in formal political participation.  
Public administration, as the action part of government, has the opportunity to play a crucial role 
in changing these dynamics into a more positive scenario; one in which democracy is 
strengthened rather than stifled, that upholds key values of social justice and equity in its 
interactions with the constituents it serves (especially by street-level bureaucrats), and is devoted 
to community building and improvement.  Local government initiatives that aim to facilitate 
immigrant integration and build trust in government among disenfranchised communities are 
discussed.  
Conceptual Framework  
 Schneider and Ingram’s theory of policy design (1997) describes how the way in which 
groups are socially constructed determines not only the type of public policies afforded to them, 
but even how the implementation process will likely unfold based on the underlying assumptions 
tied to each group’s identity.  Groups are socially portrayed as deserving or undeserving of 
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beneficial policy and positive government intervention.  Undeserving groups are presented as 
deviants, criminals, and a threat that society must be protected from, justifying the use of unequal 
policy burdens created and administered by the state.  These policy burdens garner mass amounts 
of public support because they manipulate symbols, rhetoric, images, and distort logical lines of 
inquiry to justify policies that “afford privilege to some and stigmatize and disenfranchise others” 
(1997, p.6).  It is noteworthy to mention Schneider and Ingram believe public policies comprise a 
series of ideas, assumptions, and symbols that may not be explicitly formally written in text, but 
whose embedded beliefs and values become evident through practices, symbols, and discourse.  
Since the state itself socially construes identities that are linked to how public policies are 
designed, then it is the state itself that is responsible for creating and/or perpetuating social 
inequality.  This makes public administration an especially relevant area of inquiry since the way 
in which bureaucracies are administered (both formally and informally) is critical in setting the 
tone of how individuals interact and experience government.  Discrimination at a structural level, 
the “accumulated institutional practices that work to the disadvantage of racial minority groups 
even in the absence of individual prejudice or discrimination” (Link & Phelan, 2001), is then an 
issue of bureaucracy.  
 Groups that are socially constructed as deviants or criminals and are punished through 
disproportionately policy burdens are the result of careful political strategy by those in power 
because “stigma is entirely dependent on social, economic, and political power” (Link & Phelan, 
2001).  Political leadership manipulate policy dynamics to “create a constituency on whom they 
can confer benefits and receive the accolades not only of the group itself, but of the broader 
public who believes the government has achieved a public policy success” (Schneider & Ingram, 
1997, p. 6).  This is why this paper argues Latinos, especially foreign-born Latino immigrants, 
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meet the criteria to be placed in this category—they collectively lack the social and political 
clout as well as economic resources to challenge their negative social image, yet political leaders 
are able to reap vast political gains in their careers by making use of this calculated political 
opportunity and punishing an “undeserving” group.  This was observable during the 2016 
presidential campaign and Trump’s xenophobic political rhetoric.  After the election, in the first 
week of his presidency, Donald Trump signed an executive order comprised of anti-immigrant 
policy measures, including build a border wall along the U.S.-Mexico border, a travel ban to 
Muslim-majority countries, and vastly expanded the resources used for immigration enforcement, 
meaning detention and deportation.  Groups are politically used as scapegoats and construed as 
social problems, especially during moments of economic downturn; Latinos and Latino 
immigrants make for easy targets and this is unlikely to change due to the group’s low levels of 
social and political capital.  “Latinos, over the years, have consistently represented over 90% of 
those in immigration detention, prosecuted for immigration violations, and removed as ‘criminal 
aliens.’ The consequences have resulted in the devastation of Latinos, their families, their 
communities, and the countries of their origin, thereby contributing to their inability to gain 
economic and political stability” (Vasquez, 2015, p. 599).  Latinos are deliberately chosen for 
punitive policy because they lack social and political clout and economic resources; then, it is 
because of this oppressive process that the group is hindered from advancing to a social position 
in which garnering increased levels of social, political, and economic support is possible.  This 
dysfunctional cycle is a serious problem; it perpetuates inequality because it lacks self-correcting 
mechanisms, it deceives and discourages active citizenship, and ultimately, results in long-term 
policy failures that are detrimental to democracy (Schneider & Ingram, 1997, p. 5)  
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The political gain that results from punishing a deviant and powerless group has similar 
effects to allocating social benefits to a positively construed and powerful group; the former, 
however, is attractive to political leadership because it provides an avenue to make policy (some 
to serve a mainly symbolic purpose), and, theoretically, make substantial political gains without 
having to spend limited and scarce tax dollars.  This political payoff for policy makers makes the 
use of deviant punishment even more attractive during times of economic hardship (Schneider & 
Ingram, 1997).  This is relevant to the current context since, due to the great recession of 2008, 
governments at all levels have been forced to make due with less financial resources and have 
been cornered into making budgetary cuts, resulting in challenging and highly politicized 
decision-making processes that have chosen which policies and programs to fund and which to 
eradicate.   
 Schneider and Ingram (1997) state that individuals internalize and interpret the messages 
they experience from government based on the social category they belong to.  Policies are 
lessons that reveal how much (or how little) social groups are valued by society (1997, p. 6).  
The social category of individuals shapes and sets the tone of interactions between them and the 
state.  These exchanges and policy experiences create citizens who either feel valuable and 
believe in government efficacy because these formal systems have traditionally worked for them, 
or, conversely, these exchanges and/or policies result in individuals who withdraw from formal 
political processes because they consider it futile since they believe government does not care for 
them, making political participation a waste of time.   
 Governments actively send messages and lessons through policy.  The messages that 
individuals internalize as a result of their experience with policy (and a given policy’s political 
discourse, framing, and administration) are critical in shaping political participation patterns, and 
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participation is critical for the functioning of democracy.  Participatory democratic theories have 
long argued that institutional arrangements leave their imprints on citizens; these processes then 
impact an individual’s educative effects of political participation (Soss, 1999, referencing 
Pateman, 1970).  Soss, in his formative work on welfare programs and these programs’ 
recipients, has conducted numerous studies that provide confirmatory empirical evidence that 
government interactions do shape adult political learning and their subsequent recourse from 
political action; “as citizens participate in welfare programs they learn lessons about how citizens 
and governments relate, and those lessons have political consequences… Program designs 
structure clients’ experiences in ways that shape their beliefs about the effectiveness of asserting 
themselves at the welfare agency. Because clients associate the agency with government as a 
whole, these program-specific beliefs, in turn, become the basis for broader orientations toward 
government and political action” (p. 364).   
This paper begins with an overview of how Schneider and Ingram (1997) described the 
process by which those in power are able to socially construct knowledge and frame problems in 
a perverse way that allows political leaders to capitalize and make professional gains.  Then, the 
history of how Latinos and Latino immigrants came to be socially constructed as a 
multidimensional threat as it relates to policy making is divided into four threat categories and 
summarized: the first theme portrays Latinos as a threat to public safety by tightly linking 
immigration and criminality “crimmigration” in the public discourse; secondly, Latinos are 
routinely presented as an economic threat consuming scarce public resources, taking jobs from 
natives, and affecting labor and wages; furthermore, this group also represents a symbolic threat 
to culture, language, assimilation, and America’s national identity; and finally, in a post 9/11 
world, the most current theme involves Latinos and Latino immigrants as a threat to national 
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security.  “Immigrants have been subjected to stigma, discrimination, and violence throughout 
the nation’s history. Yet it was only at the end of the twentieth century that immigration law 
became so enmeshed with criminal law that the ‘penalty of deportation’ became ‘most difficult’ 
to divorce… from the conviction,’ as the Supreme Court concluded in 2010” (Garcia Hernandez, 
2013, p. 1460).   
This paper suggests that Latinos’ social construction has created a stigma and image 
portrayal deeply linked to criminality and security, which then culminates as a barrier to political 
participation because Latinos have been indoctrinated as undeserving and are mere quiescent 
observers of government.  The social construction and manipulation of image portrayal executed 
by the state against Latinos is not reserved for those who lack legal immigrant status.  The net 
that was cast in suspicion of “the other” is wide and continues to widen; according to a national 
poll, Americans “mistakenly believe that most immigrants are undocumented or illegal” 
(Magana & Short, 2002).  The tight link between immigration and criminality is a precise 
example of Schneider and Ingram’s work that explains how leadership politically maneuver 
symbols, frame issues, and pass public policies that are undemocratic, faulty, and hinder political 
integration and democracy as a political strategy; this is done at the expense of stigmatizing 
groups that lack the social and political capital to challenge them and a compromised democracy.  
The paper then continues with research methods, data and findings, and concludes with a 
discussion on the practical implications of these findings aimed to especially serve local 
government and municipality administrators.  
 Socially Constructing “Problems” by Power Elites 
Michelle Alexander, author of The New Jim Crow (2012), recently said in an interview 
that the most heterogeneous societies are the most punitive (2016).  Indeed, the “politics of 
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punishment” are used strategically for calculated political reasons among leading policy makers 
and can be quite effective.  For example, a recent Retro Report by the New York Times titled 
“Welfare and the Politics of Poverty” (May, 2016) presents how democrat Bill Clinton politically 
capitalized from his harsh welfare reform bill in the 1990s by openly punishing welfare 
recipients; these individuals were repeatedly framed and portrayed by politicians and the media 
to the public as lazy, abusive of the public assistance system, and a threat to scarce public 
resources.  In retrospect, the report argues the bill did not succeed in its stated objectives of 
reducing the number of Americans in poverty, ending the need for social welfare programs, or 
decreasing social inequality in America.  However, this welfare bill can be interpreted as a 
success in that it communicated harsh symbols and divisive political rhetoric; it propelled 
Clinton’s political career by adding legitimacy and increasing public support for him in his 
punitive stance against the villains in this story, the poor and unemployed.  
Those in power opportunistically craft and define social “problems,” frame these issues 
as urgent social threats, then present their proposal of government intervention as the best 
(sometimes, the only), most plausible solution.  In this sense, Trump’s concept of fake news is no 
novel phenomena because empirical facts have never mattered, only public perception.  From a 
democratic perspective, “dishonest or deceptive policies undermine citizenship and confidence in 
a democratic government” because of their role in perpetuating inequality (Schneider & Ingram, 
1997).  
An illustration of personal gains by manipulating perverse policy dynamics is evident in 
Arizona’s governor’s political career, Jan Brewer.  What was supposed to be a “slam dunk 
campaign for the democrat [Terry Goddard],” ended up an easy re-election for Governor Brewer 
in the midterm elections held earlier this month (Newton, 2010).  The win was credited to the 
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politics of S.B. 1070; it was “fueled by her staunch support of Arizona’s controversial 
immigration law.”  Arizona newspapers’ headlines following the 2010 midterm elections 
included statements like “Jan Brewer rides Arizona’s immigration law to victory; Governor’s 
wide lead over Dem Goddard highlights comeback,” “Brewer’s Immigration Boost,” and 
“Brewer’s Political Fortunes Reversed” (Medrano, 2010; Newton, 2010; Nowicki, 2010).  
Another article reported on the “reversal” of Brewer’s political favorability among the public by 
claiming Brewer’s “political fortunes were reversed by her signing of and strong support for the 
state’s new immigration law.”  Her approval ratings also increased after she signed S.B. 1070 
(Rasmussen Reports, 2010). These excerpts illustrate the political benefits of imposing punitive 
policies to undeserving, negatively portrayed groups who lack the social, political, and economic 
resources to challenge these negative stereotypes.   
Trump continues this illustration seamlessly.   Trump announced his candidacy, and 
though initially not taken seriously, went on to win more primary contests than any of his 
opponents.  In his presidential announcement speech, Trump said, “When Mexico sends its 
people, they’re not sending their best. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and 
they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. 
They’re rapists. And some I assume, are good people.”  A key cornerstone of the Trump 
Campaign, which has won more state contests than any of his opponents, is a promise to build a 
wall along the southern international border with Mexico.  Footage of rallies show large crowds 
cheering in support of Trump’s promise to build a wall between the U.S. and Mexico.  This 
illustration showcases how politically advantageous the use of rhetoric, framing, and symbols 
can be.   
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Trump’s political rhetoric frames immigration as a dire problem and immigrants as a 
threat that is multidimensional; firstly, immigration is framed as an economic threat in which 
immigrants are taking jobs, driving down wages, and are responsible for a lagging economic 
recovery that continues to shrink the middle class.  Secondly, Latino immigrants (especially 
those of Mexican origin) represent a symbolic threat that jeopardizes America’s culture and 
national identity (see Huntington, 2004); thirdly, Trump’s political rhetoric and framing alludes 
there is also a real safety threat in which American citizens need protection from Latino 
immigrants’ criminality, including gangs and organized crime tied to smuggling of drugs and 
other criminal activities.  Lastly, Trump also reveals the perception of a real security threat in 
which the U.S.-Mexico border is a vulnerability that endangers national security and must be 
protected.2  The four politicized items expressed in the aforementioned section that manipulate 
the Latino image in the U.S. will be elaborated on next.  
Overview of Negative Social Construction and Framing of Latinos 
The domestic theater that frames immigrants as a threat and its accompanying political 
rhetoric by politicians and the media calling for government intervention through legislation is 
anything but novel; it can be traced to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (Nevins, 2002, p. 97) 
and has been reinforced consistently by both Democrats and Republicans (for example, Clinton 
had Operation Gatekeeper and Bush had Operation Streamline; see Vasquez, 2015, p. 639).  
Rhetorically, expanding “criminal” to “criminal alien” has cast a wide net of blame and 
suspicion to the threat of “the other;” practical implications of this manifest in ways that 
disproportionately burden and discriminate against Latinos and Latino immigrants (see, for 
example, Moreno Saldivar, 2015 for disproportionate red tape burdens on Latinos; see Moreno & 
                                                        
2 Trump also publically called for a ban of Muslims traveling to the United States as a counter-
terrorism strategy.  
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Riccucci, forthcoming, on discriminatory and racial profiling local policing as an extension of 
immigration enforcement).  “Crime control and migration control have become so intertwined 
that they have ceased to be distinct processes or to target distinct acts, for both noncitizens and 
individuals suspected of being noncitizens” (Garcia Hernandez, 2013, p. 1457).  Because of 
government’s history of escalating its restrictive immigration and security measures, a growing 
concern of social justice is how this targets foreigners and immigrants, and is troublesome when 
citizens and legal residents are profiled and stripped of their legal rights because the threat of 
“the other” continues to grow and government discretion in this policy area continues to widen.   
Although people of “numerous nationalities enter the U.S. without proper permissions to 
overstay their visas,” this negative image is “disproportionately most enforced on Mexicans and 
[following the attacks of September 11th] Muslim men” (Spiro, 2010).  Still, politicians, power 
elites, and policy makers have exploited politics to their advantage by also making the site of the 
U.S.-Mexico border a contentious one; the border is a theater stage crafted for the American 
domestic audience that elites use to make constituents feel safer and garner political support.  
However, this is problematic when we consider the U.S. has known for decades that over 65% of 
undocumented immigrants in the U.S. did not enter illegally via the border, but are visa 
overstayers (Andreas, 2000).  Policy efforts that have militarized the border and escalated the 
levels of resources diverted to this area can then be objectively defined as policy failures (Chebel 
d’Appollonia, 2012).  Yet, the U.S. continues with more of the same political rhetoric, framing, 
and policies to portray symbolic images to its domestic audience, and, based on Trump’s wins in 
state contests, this proves to be more politically effective than presenting actual facts. 
Immigrants’ Economic Threat 
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An often-manipulated image is the one that frames immigrants as taking more than they 
give to the American economy, of being welfare-seekers that disproportionately consume scarce 
public resources, and of depriving citizens of jobs.  However, studies show “the mere presence of 
immigrants, both legal and illegal, in the economy results in a net gain in taxed, both federal and 
local, as well as overall spending in consumption” (Magana & Short, 2002).  The fact is illegal 
immigrants “pay income taxes, property taxes, sales taxes, and even Social Security” (Reyes, 
2010).  There is an evident economic benefit aspect to immigration not accurately portrayed 
through national media outlets, but this is in accordance with Schneider and Ingram’s notion that 
knowledge is also socially constructed and what we certify as true may not always be so.  “Any 
social construction can be legitimate without constraints from ethics, facts, empirical and 
scientific evidence” (1997). 
Immigration + Criminality, “Crimmigration”   
Increasingly so, there is a retreat from “framing noncitizens as contributing members of 
society on the path to full political membership as citizens… [these are] reimagined as criminal 
deviants and security risks. They are people to be feared, their risk assesses, and the threat they 
pose managed” (Garcia Hernandez, 2013, p. 1460).  A field of study with a growing literature 
that combines the study of criminal justice, law, and immigration enforcement has been dubbed 
“crimmigration” and shows how closely linked criminality and immigration are, especially in 
political rhetoric, and this spreads easily and quickly through various large media outlets.  
Nationally, there has been a portrayal of immigrants as criminals. “Hispanic, and 
particularly Mexican, immigrants are often stereotyped as criminals” (Warner, 2005-06).  
Research, however, shows that “immigrants have a lower potential for criminality and a lower 
rate of criminal recidivism” (Warner, 2005-06).   
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Clinton, who represents the first time the Democratic Party started using the term “illegal 
immigration,” (a term in use by Republicans since 1984) added to this image portrayal of Latinos 
and immigrants through his own federal immigration legislation, the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996.  His legislation prioritized businesses and 
employers while criminalizing immigrant laborers, failing to acknowledge that Latino 
immigrants exist to meet the U.S.’s demand for cheap labor.  The Clinton Administration defined 
the border as both the site of the problem and solution of the problem, despite having evidence to 
the contrary on visa-overstayers  (Andreas, 2000).  Clinton’s immigration legislation included 
measures that brought “tougher sentencing, double penalties, construction of physical barriers 
[along the U.S.-Mexico border], and use of technologies and equipment on the border [originally 
intended for military purposes]” (Andreas, 2000).  Clinton also marked the subtle impetus for the 
perception of immigration as a cultural threat in the U.S., legitimizing concerns that about 
Latinos’ affecting American values, language, and fueling beliefs that Latinos do not assimilate 
fast enough.  Evidence on cultural aspects also points to the contrary (for example, see Cornelius, 
2005; Citrin et. al, 2007).  
An increased reliance on criminalizing Latino immigrants, despite the empirical facts 
available that can discredit these claims, has become institutionalized and, therefore, legitimate.  
This is a component of the theory of policy design—Schneider and Ingram point out that 
pathology underlying policy making can be indoctrinated through the social construction of a 
reality that becomes widespread and accepted because it is repeated by “culture, socialization, 
history, the media, literature, religion, and the like. The social construction of knowledge refers 
to the way facts experiences, beliefs, and events are certified as ‘true’” (1997, p. 75).  Policy 
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decisions are critical because they determine the rights each class of migrant enjoys, as well as 
how aggressively those rights are enforced” (Cornelius & Rosenblum, 2005, p. 112).   
Immigration & New Security Paradigm 
Immigration enforcement post 9/11 has expanded so much that this area of research is 
now a standalone field—the securitization of immigration governance (Chebel d’Appollonia, 
2015).  This refers to how political elites in power frame immigration as a security issue.  In the 
U.S. and in Europe, immigration policy is framed and presented as counter-terrorist policy and 
vice-versa.  
Because of these post 9/11 developments, I argue that applying Schneider and Ingram’s 
(1997) work to Latinos and/or Latino immigrants requires a number of revisions.  Schneider and 
Ingram (1997) originally present punitive policies as a means of communicating symbols and 
messages and gaining public support without spending [large amounts of] tax dollars.  In the 
evolution of immigration governance and the policy dynamics embedded in this policy area, 
however, this is not the case at all.  Aside from the unquantifiable cost of demoralizing groups 
that are deemed unworthy, invaluable, and indispensable to government, in the specific case of 
criminalizing immigrants, this has been a very financially costly endeavor.  The escalation of 
securitized immigration policies is largely symbolic and these policies fail to meet their stated 
intended outcomes (Chebel d’Appollonia, 2012).  The cost can be classified into two categories: 
the case of Arizona’s legal fees in defending S.B. 1070 in court, and the dollar amount invested 
in the escalation measures and expansion of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).3   
For the state of Arizona alone, after Arizona passed S.B. 1070, District Court Judge 
blocked the most controversial components of the law.  The state filed for an appeal, asking the 
                                                        
3 Figures for the War on Terror, now added to policy dynamics of this area are astronomical and 
not reflected here.  
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blocked injunctions be removed.  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ultimately ruled 
against Arizona, and let the previous decision stand (Lacey, Appeals Court Rules Against 
Arizona Law, 2011).  Arizona Governor Jan Brewer spent nearly a total of $1.5 million on the 
legal defense of Senate Bill 1070 (Duda, 2011), now amended as House Bill 2062.   
By creating the threat of the illegal alien, the INS and the U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection became the fastest growing federal agencies; the INS annual budget tripled from $1.5 
billion to $4.2 billion, and the Border Patrol’s budget also increased by approximately 150% in 
1998 (Andreas, 2000).  The Immigration Reform of 1996 included the construction of physical 
barriers along the border and the implementation of new and more advanced technologies to be 
used for border security; it was then the notion to use modern warfare equipment along the 
international border was introduced and has remained.  During the Bush administration, the 
“Secure Border Initiative” was set forth hiring military contractors to apply some of the same 
technology used in Iraq and Afghanistan along the international border; “the Bush administration 
intends to not simply buy an amalgam of high-tech equipment to help it patrol the borders—a 
tactic it has also already tried, at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars, with extremely limited 
success. It is also asking the contractors to devise and build a whole new border strategy that ties 
together the personnel, technology and physical barriers,” (Lipton, 2006).  The Initiative also 
increased the number of Border Patrol Agents from 11,500 to 18,500.  Still, using the tools of 
modern warfare for border security is significant because it marks the use of war equipment at a 
time of no war; it is meant to convey symbolism to its domestic audience and placate public fears 
about an out of control border, and it also significant because there have been many “elaborate 
border technologies that have proven to be ineffective and wasteful” (Lipton, 2006).  For 
example, in Arizona, a $6.8 aerial vehicle used to patrol the border at night along a 300-mile 
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stretch crashed within a year of its use, raising skepticism about the effectiveness of high-tech 
equipment for border security purposes.  The Initiative began by the Bush Administration, 
eventually awarded the military contract to Boeing and should be by now covering the entire 
2000 mile international border with Mexico; however, Homeland Security Secretary Janet 
Napolitano announced March 2010 the “virtual fence” project would come to a halt, after $1.1 
billion had been spent on the project with “little to show for it beyond the two testing sites in 
Arizona.  Napolitano said the project had “produced little more than headaches for the federal 
government,” (Archibold, Budget Cut for Fence on U.S.-Mexico Border, 2010).  Billions of 
dollars have been spent on border security, so contrary to Schneider and Ingram’s premise, in the 
case of immigration and security policy, this politically successful and “degenerative policy” has 
succeeded at negatively constructing the immigrant as a deviant and targeting this “nuisance” for 
political gains; however, in doing so, it has incurred the cost of billions of dollars, a deviation 
from traditional degenerative policies.  
 Evidence of Policies as Lessons, Messages 
Policy decisions send messages to citizens and are powerful when we consider that these 
can communicate to individuals how much or how little government values them.  A quantitative, 
three-wave study done by Brodkin et al. (2010) provides empirical data to corroborate this 
argument.  Brodkin et al. (2010) found that individuals opt for voluntary exclusion of social 
programs as a result from the interaction between rules, modes of governance, and informal 
practices of an administrative organization.  This study examined two different social welfare 
programs and the motivation behind eligible individuals who voluntarily left the program; the 
study concludes that administrative procedures have the potential to lead to nonparticipation.  
This is critical in understanding that individuals do internalize messages about their self worth 
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based on how government treats them; when individuals decided to leave the program for 
nonprocedural reasons and not for reasons tied to eligibility, the authors concluded that these 
individuals were targeted with disproportionate amounts of red tape, creating a deliberate barrier 
of highly scrutinized means-tested processes that sent a message to individuals about their value 
to the state.  Additional research on administrative burdens by Moynihan, Herd, and Harvey 
(2014) empirically show that vulnerable populations experience administrative burdens in the 
form of additional learning, compliance, and psychological costs.   
Existing research has long emphasized the institutional design in administering social 
programs, as this determines the quality of rights experienced by recipients.  King and Waldron 
emphasized the institutional form of provision is even more critical than the fact of provision; 
rights of social citizenship exist only through “provision for need that is given universally, that is 
provided without supplication or stigma, and that avoids as far as possible the invidious 
operation of official discretion” (1988, p. 422).   
This argument becomes invaluable to the field of public administration when we consider 
that the distance between the administration of policies and the individuals that experience them 
is a short one, especially when taking into account the role of street-level bureaucrats.  Edelman 
(1988) discussed the policymaking process as one so often relegated to the status of a distant 
“spectacle;” however, Soss (1999) makes a critical argument—public bureaucracies are 
immediate experiences with government for citizens.  “Legislatures may host more dramatic 
political activities, but the police station, the motor vehicles office, and the Internal Revenue 
Service are more likely to supply citizens with lessons about government that ring with the truth 
of first-hand experience. From mundane encounters at the post office to the more total 
experience of prison life, public bureaucracies should be studied as sites of political learning” 
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(Soss, 1999, p. 376).  This makes Schneider and Ingram’s work on policy dynamics, from the 
perspective of public bureaucracy and administration, even more impactful.  
Policy Lessons’ Impact on Political Participation  
Sapiro (1994) emphasizes that social programs are critical sites of adult political learning.  
Soss’s (1999) research of the AFDC social welfare program provides empirical evidence of 
public social programs creating stigma in its participants and their subsequent attitudes on 
government efficacy (based on the messages they internalized) and their political participation; 
not surprisingly, participants were deeply discouraged from any sort of political action.  Soss 
found that one hundred percent of participants interviewed in his study reported feeling 
stigmatized in society by their participation in the AFDC program.  Based on their participation 
in this welfare program, AFDC recipients reported feeling insecure and were more inclined to 
political isolation, not engagement.  Previous research explains that welfare recipients accept 
negative stereotypes of fellow recipients, and actively seek to distinguish themselves from this 
group; this ultimately leads to serious social and political implications (Briar, 1966; Goodban, 
1985; Rank, 1994; Seccombe, 1999).  Soss’s research aligns with social control theory, which 
suggests that institutions can reinforce the marginality of the poor both through the messages 
they convey to the public as well as the messages they communicate to its recipients.  When 
clients participate in welfare programs, they gain lessons about how governments work and with 
whom they relate to; these lessons shape patterns of political participation.  Welfare recipients 
have been responded with quiescence; similarly, Latinos react to immigration and security 
policies with acquiescence responses as well.   
Data and Methods  
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 This study collected original qualitative data in the form of 28 in-depth interviews in the 
state of Arizona.  Deliberate, purposive sampling method was used to ensure variation of Latinos 
by a number of critical characteristics mentioned in the literature, including educational 
attainment level, immigration status, and generational cohort (please see Tables 1-4).  The cities 
of Phoenix, Yuma, and San Luis are included, and all Latinos are of Mexican nationality.   
Purposive sampling (Teddlie & Yu, 2007) was used to deliberately include interviews 
with Latino noncitizens who are ineligible to vote.  The purposive sampling began with 
participants who self-selected themselves and volunteered to participate when informed of this 
research project in Yuma, Arizona.   Recruiting participants for this study was done through 
snowball sampling and fieldwork; the researcher asked for referrals to continue the data 
collection process and gave participants certain criteria to deliberately attempt to include as 
much variation in participants as possible.    
Interviews were conducted in the cities of Yuma, San Luis, and Phoenix in 2012; then, 
follow up interviews were completed in 2016 once the presidential campaign was in full effect.  
Arizona participants represented first, second, and third generational cohorts and included 
undocumented, permanent legal residents, and naturalized citizens.  Structured interviews using 
open-ended questions were used.  Each interview lasted on average 50 minutes.  Respondents 
were allowed to choose whether to have the interview in English or Spanish; eight were done in 
English and the remaining 14 were done in Spanish.   
This study consulted interview questions previously used by Soss (1999) in his research 
with welfare participants to address concerns of question validity and reliability.   Soss asked 
participants their views and attitudes on who and what influences public policy decisions; why 
political outcomes turn out the way that they do; whether governments do what citizens want; 
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whether governments listen to “people like me;” whether political action is effective; whether 
“people like me” could influence government decisions (1999).  These questions are appropriate 
for this study because they contain the “framing dynamics” portion from Schneider and Ingram’s 
model (1997, p. 74).  This causal mechanism of the cycle includes aspects on the experiences of 
individuals by a given policy; the messages, interpretations, and lessons these individuals deduce 
from this experience; the conceptions of government and the role of citizens; and, finally, 
patterns of political participation.  Below are the primary research questions: 
1. Do you think there is a “Latino identity” in the U.S.?  
• If so, how would you describe how the “Latino identity” is portrayed in the U.S.?  
2. Did S.B. 1070 have an effect on your interactions with local and state government entities?  
If so, how so?  Please explain.  
3. Did S.B. 1070 have an effect on your political participation?  For example, did it make you 
want to participate more or less?  (Probe allows for distinguishing between conventional 
political participation methods and unconventional.)  
4. Do you think political participation is effective? 
5. Does your local government make you feel valued? In what ways, or why not?  
• Does your state government make you feel valued? In what ways, or why not?  
• Does your federal government make you feel valued? In what ways, or why not?  
6. Can you and people like you affect government, i.e. influence government decisions?  
 
Once qualitative data was collected and transcribed, it was analyzed by “procedures of 
theme development” (Creswell & Plano Cark, 2011, p. 84).  Transcripts were organized by key 
themes.  
Findings 
 This study provides evidence that confirms S.B. 1070 is a degenerative policy as Latinos 
do internalize a number of messages from governments at different levels, which they 
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overwhelmingly report as a discouraging factor to political participation.  Latinos 
overwhelmingly report feelings of inferiority and marginalization and don’t have much desire to 
participate in either conventional or unconventional forms of participation as a result of policy 
like S.B. 1070.  However, these effects were mitigated by several factors, the first being 
geographical location; responses within the state of Arizona varied greatly depending on location.  
It is important to note all participants considered S.B. 1070 discriminatory and conducive 
to discriminatory practices, such as racial profiling by local police.  All sites expressed general 
distrust of local law enforcement and were especially fearful and demoralized because local 
police are now deputized as immigration enforcers thanks to policy initiatives like S.B. 1070.   
Latinos internalized messages of low social value, “we are just criminals,” and “they [politicians] 
only come to us during election time to pander and make empty promises.”  Latinos described 
Republicans as blatantly racist, but expressed disillusionment with the Democratic party for 
being silent and not fighting demeaning rhetoric.   
 Participants experience unequal effects of S.B. 1070, dependent on generational cohort, 
whether foreign or native born, English proficiency, rural or urban location, color of skin, and 
affiliation with community-based organizations.  Respondents believed there had been an 
increase of rules and scrutiny by law enforcement at local, state, county, and federal levels based 
on these main variables.  Participants with green cards (legal permanent residents who are 
noncitizens) felt fearful of voicing opposition or interacting with governmental entities and 
expressed greater insecurity since though they had legal status, they did not have citizenship.  
Though they would like to consider political mobilization, the most dominant emotion was fear.  
Foreign-born immigrants who had become naturalized citizens were also very fearful in 
drawing any public attention to themselves.  Participants explained that post S.B. 1070, their 
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interaction with government consisted of harsher exchanges, including longer lines of 
questioning and increased targeting by local police who are now deputized to act as immigration 
enforcers; they described these changes as permanent and likely to be emboldened even further 
with the presidential candidates trying to appeal to white voters.  Even participants with college 
degrees in professional careers who are naturalized citizens perceived increased and deliberate 
targeting based on their pronunciation of English, their foreign-born status, and/or their skin 
color; their views on political action were overwhelmingly pessimistic because “priorities on 
who matters is made very clear.” 
Participants overwhelmingly expressed in 2012 feeling ignored by the federal 
government for not intervening on their behalf when being targeted, discriminated, and “racially 
profiled” by S.B. 1070, suggesting that individuals internalize messages from governments at 
different levels in a given policy area and distinguish between the messages they infer from one 
government unit to another.  Participants’ interpretation of S.B. 1070 included that to the federal 
government, “we [Latinos in Arizona] don’t matter to them,” “we are not a priority,” and “we are 
forgotten.”  
Responses confirm the framing dynamics that Schneider and Ingram outline in their 
theory of policy design (1997), with participants referencing the way Latinos are socially 
construed throughout the United States, but especially in Arizona.  In 2016, this theme was 
emphasized once again.  “Trump is not new, it is bolder and louder, but we have been treated as 
criminals, perceived as inferior and unworthy for all of our history in this country.”  The 
narrative on the criminalization of Latinos was a prevalent response at all interview sites.  “We 
are not criminals. We are not drug dealers. We are not terrorists. Yet the state only emphasizes 
the welfare myth, the image of unintelligent lowly Mexicans, the drugs, the crime.” “My whole 
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life, being Mexican has carried a negative connotation. It implied we were poor, unable to speak 
English, a criminal in a gang, we eat beans, and probably here undocumented.” 
This criminalization, participants explained, facilitated the momentum that made the 
passage of S.B.1070 possible in 2010, “This was all built on lies, not on any real economic 
analyses or facts.”  Interviewees expressed their feelings of being treated as inferior through 
discrimination.  They described S.B. 1070 as a “slap in the face, it sent a clear message—we are 
not wanted here,” and sadly expressed the context of living in Arizona post S.B. 1070, “you are 
treated as if you’re guilty, as if you are a criminal, not a human being.”  Only one participant 
from the 28 collected throughout Arizona did not use the word “target.”  All other remaining 
interviews described feeling like targets in Arizona after S.B. 1070.  “We cannot trust the 
government here; it made us a target, it has made us the enemy.”  “Even though the federal 
government challenged Arizona’s law, it was still not enough, it showed us that we are not 
important enough to them since we were left to bear this abuse on our own.”  “The damage of 
S.B. 1070 was done when it was passed; the federal judicial challenges could not remedy this, 
the message had already been sent and could not be taken back.”  One participant unknowingly 
summarized Schneider and Ingram’s policy dynamics through the following sentence, “the 
trigger [for S.B. 1070] was the changes in the global economy, the gap between classes is 
becoming wider. This was a political opportunity for Brewer that fell from the sky; the economy 
suffers, she blames the voiceless, becomes the hero, and wins her re-election term.”  
Respondents generally expressed this sentiment again in 2016, “governments work incrementally, 
the foundation was there; the ground pieces have been laid. Of course Trump has a real 
opportunity [to win the presidency].” 
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About their attitudes on political participation, Latinos in Arizona overwhelmingly 
expressed disillusionment and disappointment, and articulated their desire to alienate and not 
participate in formal political activities because they felt “there is no point;” the few who 
diverged from this sentiment were native Latinos belonging to second or third generational 
cohorts who had been educated in the U.S. and were fully fluent in the English language.  
Overwhelmingly, participants felt like “second-class citizens” with little faith in American 
democracy.  Because of the state’s policy decisions, they felt deliberately targeted and perceived 
their citizenship and civil rights debased.   
Generational cohort proved to be critical in whether Latinos were discouraged after S.B. 
1070 or after hearing the punitive anti-immigrant discourse coming from the presidential 
candidates; second and third generation participants (whose family members were all of legal 
status, who were completely proficient in English, and whose color of skin was not profiled by 
local law enforcement) were the least affected.   
The main divergences between the participants exist in the impact on participants’ 
motivation for political action.  Community-based organizations (CBO), which are also tied to 
geographical location (metropolitan areas have the presence of four year universities and more 
local collective mobilization efforts by local non-profit organizations), play a critical role in 
organizing Latinos for political action—through both conventional and/or unconventional forms.  
When asked if they would be participating in efforts to demonstrate against anti-immigrant 
initiatives, Latinos in the city of Phoenix were the most optimistic about participation because 
they were more likely to be affiliated with community-based organizations that helped educate 
and mobilize the Latino community.  These sorts of organizations, however, did not have a 
presence in the smaller towns of Yuma and San Luis.  These smaller border towns’ lack of 
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community-based organizations may have led to the “silent reaction to S.B. 1070” Latinos 
showed in their lack of mobilization efforts.  This difference led to different responses on 
whether government cared for people like them; in Yuma and San Luis where CBO’s are less 
prominent, participants emphatically responded no, government did not care about them at all, 
and so any subsequent political action would be futile.  In Phoenix, however, where Latinos 
participants were more likely to be actively connected to a social network, the answer was much 
more positive.  Respondents were more optimistic about getting government to hear their 
collective voice; the answer indicated that government could not ignore its constituents because 
of their size and unity, even if not originally a priority for government, they would not go 
ignored if they collectively mobilized.  
Lastly, another key finding is that Latino participants commented on the security 
narrative that has become more prevalent since 9/11, which is consistent with the evolving 
literature on the securitization of immigration (Chebel d’Appollonia, 2012).  Participants 
discussed how the criminality narrative had expanded to include the threat of “terrorist.”  Latinos 
from cites of Yuma and San Luis, which are so geographically close to the southern border with 
Mexico, especially spoke at length about this, “I felt a very strong wave of negativity towards 
people like me in the aftermath of the attacks of 9/11, as if all foreigners are also terrorists.”  
This suggests that Latinos in the U.S. are disproportionately likely to experience the effects of 
securitization, a phenomenon that warrants further study and inquiry, especially as it relates to 
the use of discretion of public administrators.  This has been an observable connection made by 
the Trump Administration in targeting immigrants, calling Mexican criminals and deliberately 
pointing to Muslims as a serious security threat, as well.   
Discussion  
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These findings are especially important because it illustrates that the media, the debates, 
and the political rhetoric that nationally frame immigration send messages to Latinos and suggest 
that the scope, reach, and potential to do harm through these means can quite substantial.  
Political rhetoric used to frame policy discussions have the ability to deter individuals who are 
already vulnerable and marginalized from engaging in political processes, thwarting their civic 
engagement.  
 Limitations  
The contribution of this study is that it includes direct responses from Latinos and Latino 
immigrants themselves, including legal noncitizens as well as undocumented individuals who are 
traditionally left out of empirical studies on political participation and their underlying 
motivation.  It is important to note a few limitations in this particular research design, however, 
and these include the fact that Latinos in the U.S. are far from monolithic, and responses cannot 
be generalized.  In addition, the political mobilization of minority groups has been empirically 
proven to be affected by a number of factors, with a large faction of the literature emphasizing 
the importance of contextual factors.  The context of a Trump presidency may be instrumental in 
politically mobilizing Latinos if opportunity structures are present, even if these have 
traditionally been discouraged and politically withdrawn from participating in traditional 
electoral processes by their experience in degenerative policy designs.   
Although Schneider and Ingram (1997) predict that targeted groups are more likely to 
engage in demonstrations, rallies, and marches, or other forms of protest politics, this may be 
problematic in the context of a securitized immigration sector, given that government discretion 
is ample and that record deportations took place under the Obama administration and are now off 
to a substantial start under the new Trump regime.  In the first 100 days of the Trump presidency, 
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immigration apprehensions and arrests increased by about 38%, all other things equal.  Under the 
unchallenged wide range of discretion allocated to the state, the prediction of an increase of 
protest politics may not be a plausible alternative for foreign-born immigrants residing in the U.S.  
More research is needed on whether the role of securitization affects unconventional forms of 
political participation, especially since these channels of informal participation may be the only 
course available to Latinos who are not citizens.   
This research also cannot speak to as whether governments’ motivations are deliberate in 
the underlying communicative process that causes individuals to interpret and internalize policy 
messages and lessons a certain way.  However, this research assumes that whether deliberate or 
not, the damage of degenerative policies is done as soon as the deliberation process politicizes 
and frames issues using symbols that target certain groups, which is why this area of policy 
dynamics is imperative to study and correct.  
Future lines of inquiry can continue to base research on a securitized immigration sector, 
examining the political actions of Muslims after 9/11 in the U.S.  For example, London has 
recently elected its first Muslim mayor, Sadiq Khan, through a political campaign dominated by 
issues of religion and ethnicity.  This can provide insight on how to transform policy design 
dynamics to be self-correcting, to encourage political participation of targeted groups, and, 
ultimately, a greater level of political representation of targeted groups.  These possibilities are 
all self-correcting mechanisms that aim to challenge the use of degenerative policies.  
Local governments are also acting with innovation in attempting to resist the new federal 
administration’s fervent targeting of immigrants.  For example, deportation proceedings 
overwhelmingly begin with immigrants stopped by local police in routine stops.  Since 9/11, 
local law enforcement has been deputized to enforce immigration status, which accounts for the 
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ever-growing number of immigrants in detention awaiting deportation proceedings.  In response 
to this, local governments have formed over 100 sanctuary cities throughout the country, aiming 
to cooperate less with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and prohibit federal 
agencies from collecting immigrants after non-violent routine stops (i.e. traffic violations).  
These local governments are actively voicing their aim of ensuring immigrants feel safe and trust 
in their local government.  Other municipalities have begun using city identification cards that do 
not ask on immigration status and provide some protection for immigrants in the case that local 
law enforcement ask for a current form of ID.  These local measures are innovative in trying to 
respond to the punitive tone of the Trump administration’s actions in terminating the DACA 
program.  These measures by local government administrators and the role of community-based 
organizations will become increasingly important; currently, the Trump administration is seeking 
to add an immigration question to the next census, which would be catastrophic in that many 
Latinos will not participate and federal and/or state funding in areas most in need of public 
resources would find their budgets slashed.  
Conclusion  
Existing policy dynamics communicate messages to both recipients and the public at 
large.  Scholars have discussed that these policy dynamics can result in marginalization and 
disenfranchisement of certain groups.  For example, social control theory suggests welfare 
programs exist to isolate and punish those who are categorized as “failures” in society, “welfare 
policy …is an affirmation of majoritarian values through the creation of deviants.  The poor are 
held hostage to make sure that the rest of us behave” (Handler, 1995, p. 8).  Instead of 
encouraging solidarity and inclusion, the social welfare system isolates and marginalizes the 
poor.  In the end, recipients who receive welfare benefits are caught in a system that perpetuates 
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their social class status and remain very poor; this ultimately assures the marginalization of these 
individuals continues within the materialistic society that is the U.S. (Piven, 1995).   
This dysfunctional cycle that perpetuates social inequality is exactly why Schneider and 
Ingram write against the use of degenerative policies.  “The contents of public policy are 
strongly implicated in the current crisis of democracy” (1997, p.5).  The practical implications of 
degenerative policies are detrimental to the functionality of democracy.  We can see that this is 
true based on how individuals’ perceptions of government efficacy, their levels of trust in the 
public sphere and in political processes is closely linked to their experiences with public policy 
and its implementation.   
Practical implications of degenerative policy dynamics lead to a compromised form of 
citizenship.  As certain groups are stigmatized by those in power who politically calculate 
opportunities and risks based on the use of politicizing images, rhetoric, and symbols, these 
groups learn that the right to equal citizenship is an illusion.  If inequality exists so that power 
elites can accommodate those who society deems as “deserving” and then politically capitalize 
from this process, then those who belong to groups socially portrayed as undeserving and deviant 
lose faith in the very political systems that were put in place as direct measures of democracy 
and citizenship; they lose trust and belief in the processes that exist to provide individuals equal 
means by which to hold government accountable.  Without the mechanism of political 
participation, the demand that faulty, undemocratic policies be corrected becomes unattainable to 
those that live and experience those policies on a daily basis.  Without the mechanism of political 
participation, it is impossible to achieve political representation of those whose interests are 
marginalized so that government interventions that result in disparate impact or unequal policy 
burdens can be curbed.   
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Practical implications in the case of Latinos are especially important when considering 
the capacity and the critical role street-level bureaucrats play in the social and political 
integration process of Latinos and Latino immigrants.  This is a critical component of Latinos 
establishing and strengthening their levels of social and political capital.  This can be a driving 
force in community development and in strengthening relationships between local law 
enforcement and the communities they represent and are meant to protect.  Accepting the notion 
that policies and their implementation are sites of political learning, the field of public 
administration can use policy implementation as a site to teach constituents that values of social 
equity and equal citizenship are not just empty rhetoric or illusions, but real pillars of the public 
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Table 1 Characteristics of Participants in Arizona 
Foreign-Born Participants in Arizona:  
Fourteen Participants Total  
Gender Immigration Status College Education Age 
Male: 7 Permanent Resident: 3 
Naturalized Citizen: 4 
College: 4 





Female: 7  Permanent Resident: 3 
Naturalized Citizen: 4 
College: 2 





*Four of these participants shared during interview they had been undocumented for a certain 
period of time in the U.S. 
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Table 2 Characteristics of Participants in Arizona 
Native Participants in Arizona:  
Fourteen Participants Total (Born U.S. Citizen) 
Gender Generation in U.S. College Education Age 
Male: 7 First Generation: 3 
Second Generation: 2 
Third Generation: 2 
College: 4 






Female: 7 First Generation: 4 
Second Generation: 3 
College: 4 
No College: 3 
20-29: 2 
30-39: 2 
40-49: 2 
50-59: 1 
 
 
